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INTRODUCTION
A company files for bankruptcy when it is no longer viable in its
present condition. When a company files for bankruptcy under chap-
ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), the company's assets are
generally sold off in a piecemeal fashion, and the company is dis-
solved.' When a company files for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of
the Code, however, the company is not liquidated but instead reor-
ganized.2 Some form of payment to the creditors satisfies claims
against the company, most debts are discharged, and the company
continues operating in essentially the same business, usually with the
same management.3 For creditors, the difference between these two
forms of bankruptcy is that under chapter 7, the creditors will receive
the cash value of the company's assets, while under chapter 11, the
creditors will likely retain the company.
The reason that creditors may end up owning the company under
chapter 11 is the absolute priority rule, enunciated in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 (b) (2) (B) (ii), which generally states that no junior creditors or
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11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
Id. §§ 1101-1174. However, a reorganization plan can include a liquidation of
assets. See, e.g., id. § 1174 (allowing for the liquidation of railroads if a reorganization
plan has not been adopted).
It See id. § 1141(d) (3) (B) (stating that claims against a debtor will not be dis-
charged if the debtor does not "engage in business after consummation of the plan").
While the Code does not require that the reorganized company operate in the same
business that it did before it filed for relief, it is highly unlikely that the company will
be operating in a totally different line of business because the company will be using
the same assets that it possessed before bankruptcy.
(581)
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interest holders, such as the owners of the indebted company, will re-
tain any interest, which includes ownership in the reorganized com-
pany, before claims of senior creditors are satisfied. Since many debt-
ors cannot satisfy the claims of their creditors, the creditors would
usually end up owning the company.4 Most creditors, however, do not
want to end up running the reorganized company,' so they usually
negotiate with the debtor-often before the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy-to come up with a different solution.
Debtors can thus retain ownership and control of the reorganized
company if the creditors consent. Even if a class of creditors does not
consent, a debtor can still retain ownership of the company if a plan
of reorganization giving ownership in the company to old equity
holders is imposed upon, or "crammed down" on, the creditors.
Such a plan of reorganization is called a "new value" plan. The name
comes from the "new value exception," a judicially created doctrine
that allows old equity holders to retain ownership in the company de-
spite the absolute priority rule." After Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers, however, there was debate regarding whether a plan using the
new value exception would be confirmable.9 In Bank of America Na-
4 Why then do the creditors not sell off the newly acquired company? It would not
make sense for the creditors to sell the reorganized company if the company is worth
more as a going concern than if it is liquidated. The difference between these two val-
ues is the going concern premium. While the going concern premium is generally
positive, this is not necessarily true. For example, if a company is sold as a whole, there
may be no premium above the liquidation price. For a discussion on the analytic con-
fusion between going concern and liquidation values, see John D. Ayer, Rethinking Ab-
solute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 1000 n.198 (1989). Furthermore, the
Code likely prohibits such subsequent liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11) (re-
quiring that confirmation of the plan "is not likely to be followed by ... liquidation, or
the need for further financial reorganization").
Creditors are in the business of lending money, not running businesses.
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (A) (permitting confirmation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion if creditors accept the plan).
See id. § 1129 (b) (1) (permitting confirmation of a plan of reorganization despite
a dissenting class of claim holders if certain enumerated requirements, including the
absolute priority rule, are fulfilled). This Comment will not deal with the classification
of claims. For an example of the problems that may arise when classifying claims in
chapter 11, see Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Greystone IffJoint Venture, 948 F.2d
134 (5th Cir. 1992). It is sufficient for the reader to understand that only similarly
situated creditors can be placed in the same class. Thus, there must be at least two
classes of claim holders-creditors and equity holders.
8 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savs. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship (In re 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship), 526 U.S. 434, 442-43 (1999) [hereinafter 203 N. LaSalle] (explain-
ing the new value exception).
485 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1988) (noting that the existence of the new value excep-
tion to the absolute priority rule after the codification of the rule in chapter 11 was
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tional Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership (In re 203
N. LaSalle Street Partnership) (hereinafter 203 N. LaSalle), the Supreme
Court declined to address the issue of whether the new value excep-
tion existed."' The Court, however, did reject the new value plan at
issue, although it suggested that a new value plan that allowed for a
market valuation would be confirmable."
This Comment explores two methods that could satisfy the 203 N.
LaSalle Court and still permit the debtor to file a new value plan. Part
I examines the origin of the absolute priority rule from its beginnings
in railroad bankruptcy to its current codification in the Code. 2 Part II
traces the historical development of the new value exception from its
origins in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co." to its present exis-
tence after 203 N. LaSalle.
Part Ill examines how the new requirement imposed by 203 N.
LaSalle could be satisfied either by allowing any party to submit com-
peting reorganization plans or by allowing any party to make bids for
the equity interest in the reorganized company. It explores how each
process could occur under the Code and which method is preferable.
Drawing upon auction theory, Part Ill shows that the two methods
likely will yield the same result and suffer from many of the same
weaknesses. The competing bids method is preferable, however, be-
cause it allows creditors to distinguish easily which reorganization plan
will pay them more.
Part IV examines two considerations that would eliminate the
need for a debtor to use either proposed method in filing a new value
plan: (1) exclusion of single-asset real estate debtors from the use of
the new value exception, and (2) equality of tax treatment for debtors
filing under chapter 7 and chapter 11 of the Code. It argues that the
Internal Revenue Code should be amended to reduce the incentives
of single-asset debtors to file for bankruptcy under chapter 11.
Finally, this Comment argues that, barring amendment of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, the bankruptcy court should apply the compet-
debatable).
', 526 U.S. 434.
See id. at 458 ("[P]lans providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportu-
nities free from competition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the
prohibition of [the absolute priority rule].").
1 This Comment does not analyze the absolute priority rule under a constitutional
approach but rather under a statutory approach. See Ayer, supra note 4, at 968 (argu-
ing that there are two laws of absolute priority, one based on the Code and the other
on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
B 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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ing bids option to ensure that new value plans meet the requirements
of 203 N. LaSalle.
I. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE NEWVALUE EXCEPTION
A. Chapter 11 of the Code
One of the options available to debtors who are facing financial
distress is bankruptcy.14 Under § 301 of the Code, a debtor can volun-
tarily commence a bankruptcy case by filing a petition under a bank-
ruptcy chapter allowable to that debtor. 5 Chapter 11 is available to
any debtor that wishes to reorganize its finances 6 After successfully
filing the petition, 7 the debtor has an exclusive period of 120 days to
propose a reorganization plan.'8 A reorganization plan may be ap-
proved by all classes of creditors, in which case the bankruptcy court
will likely confirm the plan.' 9 Sometimes, one or more creditors may
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (defining who may be a debtor for the purposes of
the Code). Section 109(a) provides that only a United States resident may be a debtor
under the Code. Subsequent subsections define the requirements to be a debtor un-
der chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13. Id. § 109.
15 Id. § 301 (setting forth the process for commencing a voluntary case of bank-
ruptcy). Most debtors file for relief under chapter 7 or chapter 11 because more indi-
viduals are allowed to file under those chapters according to § 109 of the Code. Under
chapter 7, the debtor liquidates its assets and distributes them among its creditors. Id.
§ 706 (stating that the property of the debtor will be collected and reduced into
money). Under chapter 11, the debtor proposes to reorganize its finances and gradu-
ally pay its creditors. Id. § 1123 (requiring that a plan of reorganization propose how
the claims against and interests in the debtor be treated).
16 Chapter 11 is available only to "a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of
[the Code], except [for] a stockbroker or a commodity broker [or] a railroad." Id.
§ 109(d). "A person may be a debtor under chapter 7... only if [a] person" is not a
railroad or certain financial or insurance institutions. Id. § 109(b). In Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157 (1991), the Court held that chapter 11 is not limited to business debtors.
17 Among the obstacles to a successful petition are conversion or dismissal by the
bankruptcy court under § 1112 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (providing that the
bankruptcy court can convert a case into one under another chapter of the Code if
certain requirements are met, or dismiss a case if it is in the best interests of the credi-
tors and the estate). The estate referred to in § 1112 is the bankruptcy estate, which
consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." Id. § 541 (a) (1).
Once the debtor files a petition, there is an automatic stay imposed on nearly all enti-
ties, preventing such entities from most collection efforts against the debtor. See id.
§ 362 (a) (preventing listed creditors from engaging in listed activities during stay).
For a more detailed examination of the workings of the bankruptcy system, see PETER
A. ALcES & MARGARET HOwARD, BANKRUPTC: CASES AND MATERIALS 22-109 (1995).
is See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (providing that the debtor "may file a plan until after
120 days after the date of order of relief").
19 See id. § 1129(a) (setting forth the requirements for confirmation of a reorgani-
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object to the proposed plan. In these situations, the debtor may mod-
ify the plan,20 submit another reorganization plan,2' or petition the
bankruptcy court to "cram down"
22 the plan on all of the creditors.2
To protect the creditors in the event of a cram down, the court
will confirm a reorganization plan only if it meets certain require-
ments that are laid out in the Code. The court may confirm a plan
that meets all of the requirements of § 1129(a), or all of the require-
ments of § 1129 (a) except for (a) (8), which requires acceptance by all
24impaired classes. In the latter case, the plan must also satisfy all of
the requirements of§ 1129(b). In pertinent parts, § 1129(b) provides
that:
(1) [T]he court... shall confirm the plan... if the plan.. .is fair and
equitable ....
zation plan, including acceptance). The Code provides that a proposed plan must
have the acceptance of all classes of impaired creditors. An impaired class generally is
one in which the constituent claimants have not retained all their prebankruptcy
rights. See id. § 1124 (defining impairment). An impaired class of claims or interests
has accepted a plan if more than one-half of all claimants in the class, holding more
than two-thirds of the amount of debt of the class, accept the plan. See id. § 1126(c),
(d) (defining acceptance of a proposed plan). Another requirement for confirmation
of a plan is that the creditors receive as much under the chapter 11 plan as they would
have received under chapter 7. Id. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii). This is called the "best inter-
ests" test. ALCES & HOWARD, supra note 17, at 656. "Subsection (a) (7) requires the
court to conduct a hypothetical liquidation analysis and to compare the dissenter's hy-
pothetical dividend with the plan's proposed payment." Id.
The court generally looks to the creditors to ensure that the plan is fair. See 11
U.S.C. app. Rule 3018(a) (allowing equity security holders or creditors to accept or
reject a plan). The creditors likewise participate in the negotiation of any reorganiza-
tion plan through the creditors' committee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1) ("[A]s soon as
practical after the order for relief under chapter 11 of [the Code], the United States
Trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may ap-
point additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United
States Trustee deems appropriate."). The United States Trustee represents the interest
of the United States in all bankruptcy proceedings, and "may raise and may appear and
be heard on an) issue in any case or proceeding under [the bankruptcy code] but may
not file a plan." Id. § 307.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1127 (laying out the requirement for the modification of a plan).
• See id. § 1121(c) (3) (allowing the debtor to file another plan if "the debtor has
not filed a plan that has been accepted").
2 Cram down" refers to the process of forcing nonconsenting creditors to accept
a reorganization plan. The plan is crammed down the creditor's throat. See generally
David G. Epstein, Don't Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA.
L. REv. 435, 437 (1998) (describing the cram down process and noting that the Code
does not use the term "cram down").
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (allowing confirmation of a plan despite a class of object-
ing creditors).
!A See id. § 1129 (a) (outlining all of the requirements that must be met before the
court can confirm a plan).
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(2) ... [TIhe condition that a plan be fair and equitable ... includes
the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class
receive or retain on account of such claim property of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the al-
lowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any prop-25
erty.
Thus, a plan can be confirmed under § 1129(b) (2) (B) (i) despite
the objections of a class of creditors if the class of creditors would re-
ceive property equal to the amount of their allowed claims. Since a
debtor filing for bankruptcy tends to be insolvent, the requirement of
subsection (b) (2) (B) (i) is rarely satisfied.26 Rather, most plans that
are confirmed despite an objecting creditor satisfy the requirement of
subsection (b) (2) (B) (ii) instead. Subsection (b) (2) (B) (ii) provides
that a holder of a senior claim, such as an unsecured creditor with a
deficiency claim, must be paid before a holder of a junior claim or in-
terest, such as an equity holder, is paid. "[This] latter condition is the
core of what is known as the 'absolute priority rule.'"
27
B. The Absolute Piority Rule
The absolute priority rule is a legal rule that requires a bankrupt
firm to pay off its creditors in order of the claim holders' or interest
holders' priority status. Under this rule, all creditors must be paid off
before an equity holder can receive any property from the company.
Id. § 1129(b). The plan must still satisfy all of the other requirements laid down
in § 1129(a). See id. § 1129(b) (requiring that "all of the applicable requirements of
subsection (a) of [11 U.S.C. § 1129]" be met for a plan to be imposed upon an object-
ing creditor during the cram down process). Thus, a plan that is imposed upon an
objecting party must also ensure that the creditors receive as much as they would have
under the chapter 7 liquidation process. Id. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii). For a more detailed
discussion of cram down in bankruptcy, see Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to
Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
26 Debtors who file for bankruptcy do not have to be insolvent. See In reJohns-
Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[W]ith specific regard to
Chapter 11, the Code eliminates the requirement.., that the debtor be insolvent
27 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 442.
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The absolute priority rule was the response to the perceived abuses of
the railway receivership system during the beginning of the nine-
teenth century.8
Reorganization via the railway receivership system was "carefully
orchestrated."2" Typically, a creditor petitioned a court of equity to
appoint a receiver to take control of the debtor's assets and sell them
for the benefit of the creditors.3' The receiver then took tile to all of
the assets, and individual creditors could no longer levy on the rail-
road's assets.3' Rather, the various creditors would meet and agree
upon a plan of reorganization. The reorganization plan created and
empowered the reorganization committee and specified how much a
creditor would receive after the reorganization process if she trans-
ferred her claims against the debtor to the committee."3
With the plan in place, the receiver would then trigger a foreclo-
sure sale and the reorganization committee would be the winning
bidder at the foreclosure sale.34 Next, the proceeds of the sale were
distributed to the creditors in order of priority. This generally meant
that the unsecured creditors were not paid. 5 Then, the reorganiza-
tion committee would form a new corporation and transfer the assets
from the old corporation to the new corporation. Those creditors
who had transferred their claims to the committee would receive
claims against the new corporation.3' Those creditors who only had
claims against the old corporation were out of luck since the old cor-
poration would be dissolved.37
This process was vulnerable to several kinds of abuses. First, the
price that the committee would bid for the assets of the old firm was
z4 For a discussion on why the railway receivership system became the preferred
method of dealing with bankrupt railway companies, see Bruce A. Markell, Owners,
Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REv. 69, 74-77
(1991) (reciting the early history of the absolute priority rule).
,, Id. at 75.
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS




-' Id. at 961-62.
141 See id. at 963 (noting that the proceeds of the sale would not be distributed to
the unsecured creditors and shareholders because the "sale price was not enough to
pay those with the highest priority in full").
' Id. at 962.
37 See id. at 963 (stating that since the old corporation no longer exists, "all claims
against it are worthless").
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artificially low since the committee was generally the only bidder at
the foreclosure sale.s' To remedy this problem, there was ajudicially
imposed "upset price."39 The upset price was the "minimum price that
the reorganization committee would have to bid at the foreclosure
sale to acquire the assets of the railroad."4° As with any other price
control, there were some problems.4 ' If the upset price were too high,
no one would bid for the assets since the assets were worth less than
the price. The reorganization committee would not be able to bid for
the assets since they would not be able to raise the money for such an
economically irrational bid. In practice, mostjudges tended to set the
upset price low to ensure that the committee could purchase the rail-
road assets.42 This led to the creditors receiving less than they would
have received if no upset price had been set.
A more problematic development was that the court-appointed
receiver was usually the old management of the railroad company who
had led the company into bankruptcy.43  Old management would
transfer its equity interest in the railroad to the reorganization com-
mittee in return for equity interests in the new organization.44 Typi-
cally, old management also would be the management of the new
corporation. Thus, foreclosure of the railroad by the equity receiver-
ship sometimes led to the same shareholders owning the same com-
pany that was no longer subject to the claims of the unsecured credi-
tors.
45
As a result, unsecured creditors often challenged reorganizations
via railway receiverships.46 In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, the
38 The committee was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale because there were
few companies that had the resources to purchase an insolvent railroad company, see
Markell, supra note 28, at 74, and the railroad's assets, which consisted of rights of way
over narrow strips of land, and assorted rails, wooden ties, and bridges, had little scrap
value, see BAIRD &JACKSON, supra note 30, at 960.
39 BAIRD &JACKSON, supra note 30, at 964.
40iId.
41 For a more detailed criticism of price control in the context of minimum wages,
see HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 477-79 (1998).
42 See BAIRD &JACKSON, supra note 30, at 964 (discussing the problems with the use
of an upset price).
43 There were several valid reasons for including old management in the process.
Old management generally had expertise in managing operations and was "often will-
ing to contribute new cash to save their investment." Markell, supra note 28, at 76.
44 See id. (noting that an alliance arose between bondholders and stockholders in
which the "reorganization plan would often provide for the new entity to issue securi-
ties to the old equity holders upon contribution of a stated price").
45 See BAIRD &JACKSON, supra note 30, at 967.
The foreclosure of the railroad by the equity receiver discharged both the se-
THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION
Court held that the previously detailed reorganization process violates
the "fixed principle" that "property in the hands of the former own-
ers, under a new charter, was as much subject to any existing liability
as that of a defendant who buys his own property at a tax sale."
47
Boyd concerned a reorganization plan "under which all of the
stocks and bonds of the Railroad were to be transferred to a new
company... which was to purchase the property of the Railroad," and
issue new stock to repay liabilities in exchange for the interests in the
old company. Joseph H. Boyd had ajudgment against a subsidiary of
the old Northern Pacific Railroad Company, but could not levy be-
cause all of the assets of the subsidiary had been sold in foreclosure.
Boyd claimed that the new company was liable for the judgment and
the Court agreed.5°
The Court held that "such a sale would be void, even in the ab-
sence of fraud."' The Court stated that "'[a] ny arrangement of the
parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockhold-
ers are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of
either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation."' 2 Thus,
the Court found that the new corporation was still liable to Boyd for
thejudgment that Boyd had against the old corporation's subsidiary.
The Court tempered this holding by stating that
[the unsecured creditor's] interest can be preserved by the issuance, on
equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he declines a
fair offer he is left to protect himself as any other creditor of ajudgment
debtor, and, having refused to come into ajust reorganization, [cannot]
attack it. If, however, no such tender was made and kept good he retains
cured and unsecured debt. See Markell, supra note 28, at 76 (noting that unsecured
creditors "were squeezed out and given nothing"). For a discussion on why the unse-
cured creditors challenged this arrangement under fraudulent transfer law instead of
under some other state law theory, see id. at 76-77.
47 228 U.S. 482,507 (1913).
0 Id. at 488-89.
-0 See id. at 498-501 (recounting the facts in the case). Since Boyd could not levy
against the assets, his judgment did not become a lien, and therefore had the same
priority as an unsecured claim. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1994) (stating that an unper-
fected security interest is subordinate to the claim of a lien creditor, also stating, by
negative implication, that ajudgment without a levy does not have priority over an un-
secured claim); id. § 9-301(3) (defining a lien creditor as one who acquires a lien
through, among other means, a writ of levy).
5, See Boyd, 228 U.S. at 502 ("[U9 hen [Boyd] appeared and established his debt the
subordinate interest of the old stockholders would still be subject to his claim in the
hands of the reorganized company.").
51 Id. at 504-05 (citing Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co.,
174 U.S. 674 (1899)).
!-i Id. at 505 (quoting Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 684).
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the right to subject the interest of the old stockholders in the property to
the payment of his debt. If their interest is valueless, he gets nothing. If
it be valuable, he... [receives as much as he deserves].
Thus, if the debtor gives a fair offer to the unsecured creditor, the
debtor can retain an equity interest in the new corporation.
The Court, however, failed to enunciate any standard for what
would constitute a fair offer. Commentators came in to fill the gap,
and two different theories of fair offers were developed. 4 The first
theory, known as the theory of "relative priority," allowed equity hold-
ers to participate "only if the projected earnings of the reorganized
company exceeded [the] pre-receivership debt."5' The idea was that
the new infusion of cash by the shareholders led to the excess earn-
ings. The second theory, known as "absolute priority," allowed junior
claim holders to participate only "when the reorganization plan allo-
cated values in accordance" with "the full amount of a creditor's state
law entitlement upon liquidation."5' Thus, equity holders could par-
ticipate only if the claims of creditors were satisfied first, since equity
holders have a lower priority than even unsecured creditors. 7
Although Congress codified most of the features of equity receiv-
ership in 1922 and 1934 by adding sections 77 and 77B to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, it merely required ajudicial finding that proposed
reorganization plans be "fair and equitable." 8 Unfortunately, "fair
and equitable" was broadly interpreted to sustain both theories of "fair
offer."5 9 The Court finally determined which theory of "fair offer" was
correct in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co."
Case concerned a reorganization plan which allowed some of the
old stockholders, who had contributed their "financial standing and
influence in the community" to the new organization, to receive an
interest in the new corporation even though the old firm's mortgage
53 Id. at508.
54 See Markell, supra note 28, at 82 ("After weak attempts by the Court to give
meaning to the term, two different conceptions of fair offers eventually arose.").
5 Id.
56 Id.
57 In fact, shareholders have the last or residual claim on the company. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 281 (a) (Supp. 1998) (stating that upon dissolution of a corpo-
ration, all assets are first distributed to pay claims and obligations of the corporation,
and any remaining assets are distributed to the stockholders).
58 Markell, supra note 28, at 83.
59 See id. ("[Proponents of relative priority believed the language of the statute
allowed business as usual.... [0] ther creditors did not share this view.").
60 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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had not been satisfied.6' The proposed plan would have satisfied the
relative priority standard, but not the absolute priority standard.62 The
Court rejected the plan, summarily holding that the "rule of absolute
or full priority" applied to the "fair and equitable" standard enunci-
ated in section 77B." Thus, the plan could not be confirmed despite
the approval by over 90% of bondholders" because the stockholders'
retention of an interest in the company when creditors were not paid
in full violated the general rule of absolute priority.' The absolute
priority rule set forth in Case has been codified in
§ 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii).6
II. NEW VALUE PLANS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY
A. The New Value Exception
Besides determining that the fair and equitable standard required
the rule of absolute priority, the Court in Case stated that:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stock-
holders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent
debtor....
In view of these considerations we believe that to accord "the creditor
Id. at 109-20, 122-23 (finding that the total value of the debtor's assets was
$830,000 and the first lien mortgage was $3,807,071.88; rejecting the contention that
contribution of intangibles satisfied the new value exception).
'Q See id. at 119-20 (noting that the stock issuance preserved relative priorities, but
that the amount of the debtor's assets in comparison to the first mortgage amount ne-
cessitated the ultimate failure of absolute priority); Markell, supra note 28, at 84
(same). The plan preserved relative priority because the stockholders kept 23% of the
corporation, while the assets of the company were approximately 25% of the debt.
The creditors would retain a share of the company approximately worth the relative
amount of their claims. The plan failed absolute priority because shareholders re-
tained an interest in the company, despite the failure to pay the creditors in full.
63 Case 308 U.S. at 115-16. For an argument that the holding had no basis in case
law or in the plain language of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, see Ayer, supra note
4, at 974-75.
Case, 308 U.S. at 115.
65 See id. at 119-20 (discussing the priority rights of creditors in relation to those of
stockholders).
See 203 N. LaSalle 526 U.S. at 442-43 (noting that subsection (b) (2) (B) (ii) is the
core of the absolute priority rule). The absolute priority rule, however, applies only if
there is a class of dissenting creditors. The current Code does not require all creditors
to accept the plan before the absolute priority rule must be met. Rather, a class of
creditors is considered to have accepted a plan if it has been accepted by creditors that
hold more than one-half in number of allowed claims of that class and at least two-
thirds of the total dollar amount of claims within that class. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)
(1994).
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his full right of priority against the corporate assets" where the debtor is
insolvent, the stockholder's participation must be based on a contribu-
tion in money or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all
the circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.
67
This dictum formed the basis for the new value exception.6 Un-
der the new value exception, equity holders in the company could re-
ceive property from the bankrupt firm even though all senior claim
holders had not been paid in full.
Case also provided a test for when to apply the new value excep-
tion: when (1) there is a contribution in money or money's worth,
and (2) the contribution is reasonably equivalent to the participation
afforded.69 The plan at issue in Case failed to satisfy this test because
the contribution was not in money or money's worth, but rather in the
intangibles of "financial standing and influence in the community."7"
Case was decided in 1939, well before Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978. The Act did not mention the new value exception.
Thus, it was possible to infer that the new value exception no longer
71existed . Since Congress did not affirmatively repudiate the new
value exception, however, it was also possible to argue that the doc-
trine continued to exist. 2 The Supreme Court had a perfect oppor-
tunity to address this question in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahiers.k
Ahlers involved a failing family farm that owed over one million
dollars to Norwest Bank Worthington. 74 The bank moved for foreclo-
sure upon default, but the debtor filed a petition for relief under
67 Case, 308 U.S. at 121-22 (quoting Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445,456 (1926)).
68 Some commentators have called the new value exception the new value "corol-
lary." The Supreme Court, however, has used the term new value "exception." Nor-
west Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988).
Case 308 U.S. at 122. Some courts have also concluded that there is a necessity
standard-that the infusion of new capital be necessary. See, e.g., Coltex Loop Cent.
Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs. (In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners),
138 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a new value exception, if it existed, re-
quired that there be necessity).
70 Case, 308 U.S. at 122.
7 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22,
Ahers (No. 86-958), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Micro-
form, Inc.) (arguing that because Congress failed to include any exception to the abso-
lute priority rule, Congress "had dropped the infusion-of-new-capital exception to the
absolute priority rule").
See Markell, supra note 28, at 103 (arguing that Congress did not reject the new
value exception when it passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
73 485 U.S. 197.
74 Id. at 199-200.
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chapter 11.7-' Under the reorganization plan, the debtors would retain
their equity interest in the farm by contributing "labor, experience,
and expertise."7 The Court held that this was a violation of the abso-
lute priority rule because a promise of future labor is an intangible as-
set that is not an "adequate contribution to escape the absolute prior-
ity rule."'7 The Court stated: "[W ] e simply conclude that even if an
'infusion of money-or-money's-worth' exception to the absolute prior-
ity rule has survived the enactment of § 1129(b), respondents' pro-
posed contribution to the reorganization plan is inadequate to gain
the benefit of this exception."
78
Thus, read narrowly, Ahlers merely upholds the absolute priority
rule. Unfortunately, Ahlers also introduced uncertainty into bank-
ruptcy law when it left open the question of whether the new value ex-
ception survived the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.79 The Court seemed to
agree that the new value exception did not survive the Act when it
called the exception debatable."'
Despite the Court's contention in Ahlers that it left unanswered
the question of the future viability of the new value exception,"' some
courts have taken the language in Ahlers as a call for a reexamination
of the new value exception."' Because the courts of appeals have split
on whether the new value exception has survived the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978,3 it appeared necessary for the Court finally to
75 Id. at 200. In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act, which was the prede-
cessor to the current Code, and established the various chapters under which a debtor
could file for bankruptcy. The absolute priority rule was codified in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b) (2) (B) (ii) (1994). For a detailed examination of the many other aspects of the
fair and equitable rule that were not codified in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, see Ken-
neth N. Klee, Cram Down H, 64 A,. BANTR. L.J. 229 (1990).
76 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203.
77 Id. at 205.
78 Id. at 204 n.3 (citations omitted).
Id. at 203. Besides introducing uncertainty, the Ahlers decision also made erro-
neous statements concerning the absolute priority rule and the new value exception.
See Markell, supra note 28, at 86 n.113.
N" Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 205.
See id. at 203-04 n.3 ("[O]ur decision today should not be taken as any comment
on the continuing vitality of the Los Angeles Lumber exception-a question which has
divided the lower courts since the passage of the Code in 1978.").
2 See MarkeU, supra note 28, at 95 nn.163-66 (discussing cases that have rejected
the new value exception, declined to find that Congress discarded the new value ex-
ception, or attempted to refine the absolute priority rule).
" See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship (In re 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship), 126 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving a bankruptcy reor-
ganization plan granting the debtor an exclusive opportunity to propose a new value
plan which allowed the former equity holders to retain equity interests in the partner-
20001
594 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:581
answer the question. In 203 N. LaSalle, however, the Court again re-
84frained from addressing the viability of the new value exception.
B. 203 N. LaSalle
In 203 N. LaSalle, the Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association (the "Bank") was the major creditor of the 203 North La-
Salle Street Partnership (the "Partnership" or "Debtor"), an Illinois
real estate limited partnership85 The Bank had lent the Partnership
$93 million, secured by a nonrecourse first mortgage on the Debtor's
principal asset, fifteen floors of an office building in downtown Chi-16
cago. When the Debtor defaulted, the Bank moved to foreclose.
The Debtor responded by filing for relief under chapter 11 of the
Code.87
During its 120-day exclusivity period, the Debtor proposed a reor-
ganization plan under which certain partners would contribute $6.125
million in new capital over five years in exchange for the Partnership's
entire ownership of the reorganized debtorss In addition, the Bank's
$54.5 million secured claim would be paid in ful.9 The Bank's unse-
cured claim of $38.5 million would be discharged for an estimated
16% of its present value, and the remaining unsecured claims of
$90,000 held by outside trade creditors would be paid in full without
ship despite failing to satisfy the claims of senior creditors), rev'd, 526 U.S. 434 (1999);
Bonner Mall P'ship v. United States Bancorp Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899, 910-17 (9th
Cir. 1993) (same). But see Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs.
(In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners), 138 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting
a new value plan as violating the absolute priority rule because the plan prevented
noninsider creditors from being paid in full, and stating that even if the new value ex-
ception existed, the plan failed to satisfy the "necessity" requirement for new value
plans); Travelers Insur. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961
F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a new value plan because, assuming that the
new value exception existed, the partners' exclusive right to contribute constitutes
.property" under § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii), which prohibitsjunior creditors from receiving
property before senior creditors).
4 See 526 U.S. at 454 ("Which of these positions [whether the new value exception
exists or not] is ultimately entitled to prevail is not to be decided here ...
5 Id. at 437-41.
86 Id. at 438.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 440.
89 The bankruptcy court valued the assets at $54.5 million using the discounted
cash flow method. See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P'ship, 190 B.R. 567, 574-76 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1995) ("The court accepts the discounted cash flow method of valuation."),
aft'd, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). This method is consid-
ered the most accurate method for evaluating rental value. See id. (noting that the ex-
perts for both parties agreed on the discounted cash flow method).
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interest on the effective date of the plan." Although the Bank ob-
jected to the plan, the bankruptcy court considered it fair and equita-
ble and thus "crammed down" the plan on the Bank.9'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court decision."'
The Seventh Circuit held that the plan satisfied the absolute priority
rule because:
[W]hen an old equity holder retains an equity interest in the reorgan-
ized debtor by meeting the requirements of the new value corollary, he
is not receiving or retaining that interest 'on account of' his prior [jun-
ior claim]. Rather, he is allowed to participate in the reorganized entity
on account of a new, substantial, necessary and fair infusion of capital.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.94
In a decision written by Justice Souter, the Court found sufficient
ambiguity in the statutory text of § 1129 (b) to allow for "the possibility
apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on
the books as [11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b) (2) (B) (ii) ] may carry a new value
corollary." ' Thus, the Court found that the new value exception
could have survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1978.&
As a result, debtors can continue to propose new value plans and
point to this dictum by the Court to support the proposition that the
new value exception is still viable.
The Court, however, continued to limit the new value exception.
The Court stated that the partners' exclusive opportunity to invest
new value into the enterprise in return for equity interest should "be
treated as an item of property in its own right."97 Because the absence
of an opportunity for "competing bids or even competing plan pro-
posals.., renders the partners' right a property interest," old equity
holders were by definition receiving property on account of theirjun-
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 439-40.
The bankruptcy court required a minor modification to the plan but, upon
modification, would confirm the plan. See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 190 B.R. at
594-95 ("[T]he court finds that the debtor has established that its... plan complies
with all of the applicable requirements of Section 1129 .... Upon modification ....
the court will enter an order of confirmation.").
C2 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship (In re 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship), 126 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court,
which had affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to confirm the plan).
9- Id. at 964.
94 See 203 N. LaSall, 526 U.S. at 458.
5 Id. at 449.
%, See id.
97 Id. at 455.
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ior interest in the Debtor."' Such a plan violates § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii),
which prohibits junior claimants from receiving or retaining any
property on account of their junior claim or interest." Thus, the
Court held that "assuming a new value corollary,... plans providing
junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities free from compe-
tition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the prohibi-
tion of§ 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii)." °'°
The Court suggested that a new value plan would be confirmed if
there were some assurance that the price that old equity holders bid
to retain ownership was "the best obtainable." 0' The Court felt that
the only acceptable method of guaranteeing that the equity interest
was purchased at the best obtainable price was "market valuation."""2
III. NEWVALUE PLANS AFTER 203 N. LASALLE
Debtors who file new value plans, and bankruptcy courts that must
determine whether to confirm such plans, have been left with little
guidance on how to ensure that new value plans will conform with
§ 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii). While new value plans must eliminate the exclu-
sive opportunity of old equity holders, the 203 N. LaSalle Court merely
stated that "[w]hether a market test would require an opportunity to
offer competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the
same interest sought by old equity, is a question we do not decide
here."103 Thus, the Court suggested two possibilities: (1) giving other
parties an opportunity to propose competing plans, or (2) granting
other parties the right to bid for the equity interest.'14 In choosing be-
98 Id. at 456.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii) (1994) ("[T]he holder of any claim or interest
that is junior to the claims of [a class of unsecured claims] will not receive or retain
under the plan an account of such junior claim or interest in any property.").
100 203 N. LaSalle 526 U.S. 458. The Court's holding follows the suggestion of
many commentators on how to correct defects in the new value exception. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Epling, Claims & Opinions, an Exchange of Views: The New Value Exception: Is
There a Practical, Workable Solution?, 8 BANKR. DEv.J. 335, 347 (1991) (proposing that a
possible solution would be to "require exclusivity to end upon the mere filing of a new
value plan"); Markell, supra note 28, at 118-19 (calling for elimination of exclusivity).
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456.
102 See id. at 458 (stating that some form of market valuation is needed to "test the
adequacy of an old equity holder's proposed contribution").
103 Id.
104 Other possibilities may satisfy the 203 N. LaSalle Court. This Comment will not
address those possibilities because they are not as significant. For example, competing
new value plans where each plan allows for competitive bidding clearly would satisfy
the 203 N. LaSalle Court. Unless required by the courts, however, this possibility will
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tween these two possibilities, the bankruptcy court and the debtor
must examine which option is consistent with bankruptcy law and
which option provides the "best obtainable" price.105
A. Wat Options Are Available Under Chapter 11?
The two methods suggested by 203 N. LaSalle, granting other par-
ties the opportunity to propose competing plans or granting such par-
ties the right to bid for equity interest, are both available under the
Code.""
Granting other parties the opportunity to propose competing
plans, the competing plans option, is possible under the Code. The
debtor can wait until the 120-day exclusivity period expires to propose
its new value plan. This will allow other parties the opportunity to
propose their own plans. Similarly, a plan proposed by the debtor
within the exclusivity period can request the waiver or elimination of
the exclusivity period. ' The debtor can make such a proposal in its
new value plan because the Code only requires that a new value plan
satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a) and (b), with the exception of
§ 1129(a) (8). Nowhere in those sections is a debtor limited in a re-
quest to waive the exclusivity period. Finally, § 1121(d) allows the
court, for cause, to terminate the exclusivity period and allow other
parties in interest to file a plan. 8 This allows any creditor to propose
never occur because a party that has gone through the expense of drafting a con-
firmable plan would want to retain as much of the plan's benefit as possible. Allowing
other parties to bid could undermine that goal. As another possibility, the debtor-in-
possession could waive the 120-day exclusivity period. See Alexander F. Watson, Note,
Left for Dead?: The Supreme Court's Treatment of the New Value Exception in Bank of Amer-
ica National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 78
N.C. L. REV. 1190, 1222-23 (2000) (arguing that waiver of the exclusivity period is a
practical proposal for conformance with 203 N. LaSalle since it requires the least effort
from the debtor and would not require amendment of the Code). That possibility is
remote since it is strategically unsound. It would be more strategic for the debtor to
wait until the 120-day exclusivity period is over to propose its new value plan or wait
until there is no possibility of a consensual new value plan before waiving exclusivity.
1. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456.
".W There is some debate among commentators on whether there needs to be ac-
tual competing plans or bids, or merely opportunities to propose plans or to make
those bids. See Watson, supra note 104, at 1221 (discussing the uncertainties involved
in determining market value in actual practice). This Comment will anal)ze the more
difficult possibility~ that other parties will actually take advantage of their opportunity
or i ht to propose competing plans or make competing bids.
Fairness, though, will likely require the bankruptcy court to grant time exten-
sions to other parties to formulate their own plans since the debtor had 120 uninter-
rupted days.DK 11 Iu.s.C. § 1121 (d) (1994).
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its own plan comprising its own classifications of creditors and treat-
ment of each creditor or interest holder.'°9 Such plans must still be
confirmable.
The major problem with the competing plans option is that the
bankruptcy judge will be forced to choose one of several confirmable
plans. There is no clear guidance in the Code or case law to help a
judge determine which plan to confirm." ° In addition, the plans may
be so dramatically different that other creditors or the judge are
forced to "compare apples and oranges."'" Furthermore, whenever a
debtor gives up exclusivity, it potentially "open[s] the way for a liqui-
dation plan to be filed by a secured creditor."'"2 This penalizes the
unsecured creditors, who will receive nothing if the assets are liqui-
dated in cases involving undersecured creditors.
The statutory basis for granting other parties the right to credit
bid, the competitive bids option, is also consistent with the Code.
Nothing in § 1129(a) or (b) prevents a debtor from granting other
parties the right to credit bid on the equity interest on terms dictated
by the debtor. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court is empowered to
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this [Act].""' Bankruptcy courts have
historically used this power to allow third-party bidders to come into
the reorganization process at the last moment, paying a higher cash
price but maintaining all other obligations.'
4
Under the competing bids option, once a debtor proposes a new
value plan, any party can accept the debtor's plan and receive the eq-
uity interest in the reorganized company by agreeing to pay creditors
more than the debtor had proposed. The bankruptcy court will con-
firm the debtor's plan if no party is willing to accept the plan and pay
a higher amount to the creditors. A major benefit of this option is
109 See id. §§ 1122-1123 (setting forth the requirements for classification of claims
and for contents of a plan of reorganization).
11 See id. § 1129(c) (providing that if there is more than one plan, "the court shall
consider the preferences of creditors and equity security holders in determining which
plan to confirm"); ABI Real Estate Comm., A Roindtable Discussion: Supreme Court Deci-
sion 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 389, 404 (1999) (com-
ments of Professor Robert M. Zinman) (arguing that there is no statutory guidance for
thejudge to follow in choosing a plan).
Epling, supra note 100, at 348.
1 ThomasJ. Salerno, Last in Line: The Second Circuit Rejects the Viability of the "New
Value Exception" to theAbsolute Priority Rule, 1998 ABIJNL LEXIS 121, at *7 (June 1998).
113 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
14 Interview with Kathryn Heidt, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law
School, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 9, 2000).
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that the bankruptcy judge will not have to make a choice among sev-
eral confirmable plans.
The most significant problem with the competing bids option is
the lack of a determination of what procedures are needed or re-
quired by 203 N. LaSalle to ensure proper market valuation. 203 N.
LaSalle does not provide such procedures. Several procedures, how-
ever, are clearly needed to ensure the fairness of an auction. One
such procedure is the requirement of commercially reasonable adver-
tisement and promotion of the bidding process. Other issues regard-
ing applicable procedures are also unresolved. For example, should
secured creditors be able to make credit bids? A credit bid means that
a creditor could bid up to the amount of her claims and, if she wins,
she could keep the property without having to pay additional consid-
eration. "' While some commentators have called for granting secured
creditors the right to make credit bids, n6 lower courts that have exam-
ined the issue have rejected that approach" 7 It is clear that this prob-
lem will result in future litigation.
Both the competing plans option and the competing bids option
will result in an infusion of new value for the reorganized firm." This
11 See LYNN M. LoPucKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 85-87 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining credit bidding atjudicial sales of a credi-
tor's collateral; noting that the credit bid is based on the fact that the amount paid for
the property over and above the expenses of sale and up to the amount of the secured
debt goes to the creditor).
1. See Epling, supra note 100, at 348 (arguing that a process where "[o]ld creditors
(but not third parties who have bought their claims) may credit bid up to the value of
cash or new debt that they will receive under the plan" would solve some of the prob-
lems with new value plans); Markell, supra note 28, at 121-23 (suggesting that credit
bids would check owner underbids and protect creditors from debtors taking advan-
tage of low valuation).
Furthermore, in situations where a chapter 11 plan contains a proposal to sell a
creditor's collateral, "[tihe right to credit bid at the sale of the collateral is one of the
rights normally afforded by the Bankruptcy Code to secured creditors." Michael E.
Rubinger & Gary W. Marsh, Claim and Opinion: "Sale of Collateral" Plans Which Deny a
Nonrecourse Undersecured Creditor the Right to Credit Bid: Pine Gate Revisited, 10 BANKR.
DEV.J. 265, 265 (1994). 203 N. LaSalleis distinguishable, however, because the debtor
was not seeking to sell the collateral but to retain equity in the partnership that owns
the collateral. Furthermore, there is no right to a credit bid if the secured creditor can
make an 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b) (2) election. See Rubinger & Marsh, supra, at 271-73. The
creditor in this case could and did make the election. See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at
439.
17 See, e.g., In re Hickey Props., Ltd., 181 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (holding
that secured creditors cannot credit bid because they have security interests only in the
debtor's collateral, not in the debtor's equity interest).
11 Thus, this Comment does not fail one of the many criticisms of new value plans
leveled by Professors Carlson and Williams. See David Gray Carlson &Jack F. Williams,
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new cash will be used by the company to help in its reorganization, in-
cluding the repayment of unsecured creditors. Since both options are
consistent with the Code"9 and will result in new cash that will be used
in part to repay unsecured creditors, the court should choose the op-
tion that will result in the best obtainable price.
B. Which Options Will Result in The Best Price Obtainable?
1. Using Law & Economics to Evaluate the Two Options
When the 203 N. LaSalle Court called for a market valuation to
test the fairness of the equity holder's bid, the Court assumed that
only a market valuation was sufficient to ensure fairness. 2 ' The Court
has previously recognized that market valuation requires a price set in
market conditions.12' Thus, the bankruptcy court must determine
which option most closely satisfies the requirements of market valua-
tion. When evaluating market conditions and determining fair mar-
ket price, the law and economics approach, and in this case the
branch of law and economics dealing with auctions, provides a clear
and precise methodology.
a. Why Use Auction Theory?
Auction theory is appropriate to use in analyzing the two options
because the process of competing plans and, especially, the process of
competing bids, greatly resemble an auction. The analytical simi-
larities between auctions and both options suggest that auction theory
The Truth About the New Value Exception to Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2000) (arguing that most commentators have failed to examine
who receives the new value).
19 This Comment assumes that the new value plan(s) produced under either op-
tion satisfy all other requirements in the Code. For an extensive discussion on the new
value exception including whether requirements such as necessity and substantiality
were superseded by 203 N. LaSalle, see Kevin T. Lantry & Jeffrey C. Krause, The New
Value Exception After 203 N. LaSalle (presented at the Financial Lawyers Conference
in Los Angeles, Cal. on Nov. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
12 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (reciting the logic of the 203 N.
LaSalle Court's holding).
1 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. ex rel. Imperial Fed. Sav. Ass'n, 511 U.S. 531,
538 (1994) (arguing that fair market price requires a price set by market conditions).
122 Commentators have noted this resemblance before. See, e.g., Markell, supra
note 28, at 107-11 (arguing that an auction is analogous to the reorganization process
and that auction theory supports participation by owners in the reorganization proc-
ess).
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may help us to understand how the debtor, creditors, and third par-
ties would behave under either process. Auction theory can also assist
in determining the optimal strategy for each party and the maximum
price that each party would bid for the property. Finally, auction the-
ory may also highlight how the parties can act opportunistically under
each option, and thus alert us to those areas of each process where
antiabuse provisions may be needed.
While there are differences between auctions and either reorgani-
zation process, it is still valid to apply auction theory. The two distinct
differences between typical auctions and the reorganization process
are: (1) auctions tend to occur at one sitting while reorganizations
occur over a very long time period; and (2) bidders pay for auctioned
property with cash while reorganizations allow plan proponents to pay
with cash or cash equi-alents.1 3 Both of these differences, however,
merely allow sellers in reorganizations to achieve higher sale prices,
which benefits the creditors. The longer time period and the ability
to use cash equivalents to bid for property increases the number of
available bidders. The reasons for this are that more bidders can find
out about the reorganization process and bidders who do not have the
available cash to bid for the property would not be excluded. The
greater number of bidders tends to lead to a higher sale price.'2 4 The
only technical difficulty in applying auction theory to the competing
plans option is that the various plans must be reduced to their net
present value.
b. The Themr ofAuctions
Auctions come in four basic forms: the ascending-bid auction, the
descending-bid auction, the first-price sealed bid auction, and the
second-price sealed bid auction."n In the ascending-bid auction, the
most common type of auction, the bids gradually increase in value un-
til the highest bidder wins the auction.'26 In a descending-bid auction,
2 See id. at 108 (noting the differences between auctions and the reorganization
process).
1A' For a discussion on why more bidders lead to higher prices, see Paul Klem-
perer, Aution Theo': A Guide to the Literature, 13J. ECON. SuRvs. 227, 239 (1999). The
difference in the bid price can be dramatic. See Markell, supra note 28, at 110 n.244
(collecting cases in which the price of a debtor's assets increased when additional bid-
ders became involved in the process).
See Klemperer, supra note 124, at 229 (identifying the standard auction types).
See id. (describing an ascending-bid auction). In one form of this auction, the
Japanese auction, bidders who drop out are not allowed back into the bidding process
and bidders cannot make a preemptive "jump bid." Id.
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the auctioneer begins with a very high price and gradually lowers the
price. The first bidder to agree to a price wins and pays that price."'
In a first-price sealed bid auction, each bidder independently submits
a single bid without seeing the bids of others, and the highest bidder
wins and pays the price of her bid. In the second-price sealed bid
auction, each bidder independently submits a bid and the highest
bidder wins. In this type of auction, however, the bidder pays the
price of the second-highest bid.12
This Comment will only deal with the ascending-bid auction since
it is the type of auction that is most familiar to the public and it will
likely be used in actual competing bids or plans.'" In an ascending-
127 See id. (describing a descending-price auction).
128 See id. (describing a first-price sealed bid auction).
12 See id. (describing a second-price sealed bid auction).
130 While there are generally four basic types of auctions, from an economic point
of view, there are only two types of auctions: a first-price bid auction and a second-
price bid auction. See id. at 230 (explaining why some of the auctions are strategically
the same). The reason is that the optimal strategy for an ascending-bid auction and a
second-price sealed bid auction is the same. See id. (noting that telling the truth about
your valuation is the dominant strategy). In an ascending-bid auction, the optimal
strategy is to stay in the auction until the price reaches your value. Id. Assuming that
you have the highest valuation of the property, you will end up paying the price equal
to the value of the second-highest bidder. This is the same result as a second-price bid
auction. Id. (noting that in an ascending auction, "the... person with the highest
value will win at a price equal to the value of the second-highest bidder" for these two
types of auctions). Of course, this analysis depends upon there being a single auction
and each bidder having private valuations. Id. A similar analysis applies to the de-
scending-bid auction and the first-price sealed auction. The optimal strategy in a de-
scending-bid auction is to bid when the price reaches your private valuation of the
property. If you have the highest valuation, you would be the first to bid and you
would win with your first bid. The same result occurs in a first-price sealed bid auction.
The only difference between the first-price and second-price bid auctions is that the
latter type allows for many prices while the former type restricts the bidder to one
price. From this brief analysis, it is clear that the second-price auction is more advan-
tageous to the buyer because the buyer can gain the extra utility associated with the
difference between her valuation and the valuation of the second highest bidder.
Thus, it seems strange that sellers would settle upon the ascending-bid auction. A pos-
sible answer is that the sellers may seek to attract more purchasers who are familiar
with only the ascending-bid auction. The additional bidders may lead to a higher price
than the seller could achieve with a descending-bid auction. See id. at 239 (stating that
studies show that additional bidders create more value to a seller in an ascending-bid
auction than any realistically designed auction without the additional bidders). Fi-
nally, under some conditions, the ascending-bid auction is the optimal auction for the
seller. See id. at 236-37 (noting that ascending-bid auctions lead to higher expected
prices than other auctions when the buyers' signals are affiliated). Finally, the Reve-
nue Equivalence Theorem states that where the buyers are risk-neutral, the object goes
to the buyer with the highest value, and any bidder with the lowest-feasible bid expects
a zero surplus, all types of auctions yield the same revenue to the seller. See id. at 232
(noting that this theorem is the fundamental theorem in auction theory).
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bid auction, a dominant or winning strategy for a bidder is to stay in
the auction until the price exceeds the value of the property to her.'
This strategy gives the winning bidder the best chance to get the
property.
2. Both Options Limit the Number of Buyers
Using statutory analysis and auction theory, it is clear that neither
option provides a true market valuation for the price of the equity be-
cause both options limit the number of purchasers of the equity inter-
est. The competing plans option is limited to debtors and creditors by
§ 1121."" The plain language of the Code, therefore, prevents third
parties from proposing competing plans. Thus, because fewer people
can propose plans, there will be fewer plans for the creditors or bank-
ruptcyjudge to choose from.
Similarly, the competing bids option has a limited number of bid-
ders because of asymmetric information and the incentives created by
the Internal Revenue Code, specifically, I.RC. § 382(l) (5). There is
asymmetric information because a third-party purchaser does not
know as much about the company's worth as the debtor or even the
creditors would know. Asymmetric information is an additional cost
for the third-party purchasers only, so this will reduce the amount that
third-party purchasers will bid for the equity interest.
Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code discourages third par-
ties from bidding. Section 382(l) (5) (A) of the Internal Revenue
Code penalizes a bidder for a bankrupt company where the bidder
was not a prior owner or creditor of the debtor.m Typically, § 382 (a)
114 Id. at 230. The optimal strategy for any bidder depends upon whether the auc-
tion is dynamic or static, the relative risk-aversion of the seller and bidders, and the
budget constraints of the bidders. For a more detailed discussion of the optimal bid-
ding strategy in various types of auctions, see id. at 232-37.
IL There is, however, a phenomenon called the winner's curse whereby the win-
ning bid often exceeds the true value of the property. See id. at 230 (noting that if the
bidder does not take into account other people's bids, the winner can end up paying
more than the prize is worth). For a more complete discussion of this phenomenon,
including the empirical studies concerning the winner's curse, see RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-62
(1992).
I'M See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1994) (stating that only a "party in interest, including
the debtor, the trustee, a creditor's committee, an equity security holders' committee,
a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may file a plan").
1-1 Section 382(1) (5) (A) provides that:
[I.R.C. § 382] (a) shall not apply to any ownership change if-
(i) the old loss corporation is (immediately before such ownership change)
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limits the amount of net operating losses ("NOLs") that a corporation
may use in a taxable year to a fraction of possible net operating
losses.' 3' Since NOLs are usually the most valuable assets that the
116bankrupt company possesses, this dramatically reduces the incen-
tives for any third party to bid for the reorganized company. A lower
number of bidders likely would lead to a lower winning bid'
Both options thus will likely not yield the best price possible for
the equity interest due to the limited number of bidders or competing
plans. Since both options suffer from the same defect, the bankruptcy
court should examine which method would yield the higher price for
the equity interest before determining which method to use.
3. Best Price(s) Under Both Processes
a. Best Price Under the Competing Bids Option
Under the competing bids option, old equity holders and any
other interested party can bid an amount for the equity interest. To
retain that property interest, however, the winning bidder must pur-
chase all of the company since no equity interest remains if the com-
pany is liquidated. Auction theory states that a dominant or winning
strategy for the equity holders is to bid up to the full value of the eq-
uity interest to them.Iss Bankruptcy law and tax law, however, give the
under the jurisdiction of the court in a title II or similar case, and
(ii) the shareholders and creditors of the old loss corporation (determined
immediately before such ownership change) own (after such ownership
change and as a result of being shareholders or creditors immediately be-
fore such change) stock of the new loss corporation (or stock of a control-
ling corporation if also in bankruptcy) which meets the requirements of
section 1504(a) (2) (determined by substituting "50 percent" for "80 per-
cent" each place it appears).
I.R.C. § 382(1) (5) (A) (1994). If there is another change in ownership within two years,
however, all net operating losses are eliminated. See id. § 382(I) (5) (D) (stating excep-
tons to the § 382(/) (5) (A) exclusion).
135 See id. § 382(a) (limiting NOLs to an amount equal to the value of the old loss
corporation multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate). The long-term tax-exempt
rate is determined under § 1274(d) and is the average market yield on outstanding
marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to maturity of nine
years or more (such as thirty-year Treasury bonds). Id. § 1274(d).
13 See AlbertJ. Cardinali & David C. Miller, Tax Aspects of Non-Corporate Single Asset
Bankruptcies and Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 87, 108 (1993) ("Often, the most
important tax attributes of individuals and members of a partnership are the net oper-
ating losses ('NOL') and NOL carryover.").137 For a discussion of the effect of the number of bidders on the bid price, see
Klemperer, supra note 124, at 238-40.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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various bidders different property rights that affect their respective
bid prices under this dominant strategy. Specifically, old equity hold-
ers will bid a higher amount under the competing bids option.
i. Effect of Bankruptcy Law on the Bid Price
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the reorganization process can be
converted easily into a liquidation process."9 There is thus a basic bid
price for the company-the liquidation value of the debtor's assets. A
chapter 11 reorganization plan, however, must give creditors as much
under the reorganization plan as each creditor would have received
through the liquidation process,' ° so creditors should have no prefer-
ence for a chapter 7 plan unless there is a greater delay in receiving
their money under chapter 11 than under chapter 7.141 Any debtor
who seeks to reorganize must believe that the company has some go-
ing concern value or else the reorganization plan would not be feasi-
ble and, therefore, would not be confirmable. 42 A bidder that makes
a bid for the assets of the debtor in excess of the liquidation price thus
expects a positive going concern value. Old equity holders tend to bid
a price in excess of the liquidation price because they are less risk-
averse than creditors, more optimistic about the business, and more
emotionally attached to their company. Since senior creditors know
that old equity holders typically value the company more highly than
the creditors value the company, the senior claimants can probably
afford to bid a higher price than they would normally bid. Thus, sen-
ior creditors can capture more of the going concern value of the
company under the competitive bidding option than they would have
under the old process for confirming new value plans.
IM, See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1994) (explaining the methods by which a chapter 11 re-
organization case can be converted into a chapter 7 liquidation case).
1,, SeeALcES & HOWARD, supra note 17, at 656 (stating that § 1129 (a) (7) requires
the bankruptcy court to make a hypothetical evaluation of what each creditor would
receive upon liquidation).
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (requiring that reorganization plans be feasible). In
response to the objection that the creditor may fear that the reorganized debtor would
reduce the value of the assets before becoming insolvent again, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (11), which requires that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed
by liquidation.
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (requiring, for confirmation of a reorganization
plan, that the debtor would not be likely to require additional refinancing or subse-
quent liquidation).
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ii. Effect of Exclusion of Cancellation-of-Debt Income Under I.R.C.
§ 108 on the Bid Price
The Internal Revenue Code also greatly affects the bidding strat-
egy of the various participants. 4 3 Normally, discharge of indebtedness
or cancellation-of-debt ("COD") is considered income.'4 Thus, if the
bank had been able to foreclose or liquidate the assets, the individual
partners would have to pay taxes on the sale price of the property plus
the remaining unsatisfied debt minus the adjusted basis of the debtor
in the property. 145 The partners in the real estate limited partnership
143 As the Court noted in 203 N. LaSalle 526 U.S. at 438, the debtor entered into
bankruptcy because of tax considerations. While § 1129(d) allows a court upon chal-
lenge to deny confirmation of a plan if there is no business purpose for the plan ex-
cept tax avoidance, this does not mean that having a tax planning purpose precludes
filing for bankruptcy. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St.
P'ship (In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship), 126 F.3d 955, 969 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a desire to avoid a significant tax liability, if legal, is consistent with the bankruptcy
code), rev'd, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). For a more detailed discussion of the effect of the
Internal Revenue Code on single-asset bankruptcy cases, see Cardinali & Miller, supra
note 163, at 87.
1 See I.R.C. § 108(a) (1994) (stating that unless the taxpayer falls into one of four
exceptions, discharge of indebtedness is included in gross income). The two most im-
portant exceptions are: (1) for cases in chapter 11 of the Code, and (2) if the individ-
ual taxpayer is insolvent. Id. § 108(a) (1) (A)-(B).
The exclusion of COD income also applies to limited partnerships. Limited part-
nerships are business associations that share the tax treatment of partnerships and the
limited liability of corporations. See WILLIAM L. GARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 114 (7th ed. 1995) (describing the charac-
teristics of limited partnerships). In a limited partnership, there are "one or more
general partners and one or more limited partners." Revised Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act ["RULPA"] § 101 (1985). Illinois, where the 203 N. LaSalle Street Part-
nership was created, adopted the RULPA in 1987. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
210/100 (West 1993) (adopting RULPA). The general partner has unlimited liability
while a limited partner's liability is limited to her interest in the partnership. See
RULPA § 303 ("A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partner-
ship unless he [or she] is also a general partner, or... he [or she] participates in the
control of the business."). The partners are taxed based on their pro rata interest in
the partnership. A discharge of indebtedness income, excludable by I.R.C. § 108(a),
would thus apply at the individual partner level and not the partnership level. See
I.R.C. § 702(a) (8) (1994) (stating the application of income distribution for the pur-
poses of the federal income tax). It is for this reason that partnerships have been ig-
nored in some analyses of bankruptcy taxation. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, From Crane to
Tufts: In Search of a Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 4 nn.17 & 19 (1982) (arguing that the partnership aspect could be ignored
since "the issues are the same, whether the building was held in a partnership or by the
taxpaers individually" because the partnership is a nontaxable entity).
There is no indication concerning the amount of personal insolvency for each
partner in 203 N. LaSalle Thus, this Comment will not address the effect of personal
insolvency on the chapter 11 reorganization process. Even if personal insolvency had
been mentioned, that topic is best left for another article.
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would have been personally liable for about twenty million dollars if
the bank had been able to foreclose. Section 108(a) thus creates an
incentive for a taxpayer to file for bankruptcy under chapter 11 in-
stead of another chapter of the Code, and to file for bankruptcy in-
stead of allowing foreclosure because it permits the taxpayer to ex-
clude COD income.
47
While it seems that only the partners of the debtor, in their indi-
vidual capacities, could receive the tax benefit of § 108(a) ,14 the pro-
posed change to the reorganization process would allow senior credi-
tors to capture some or all of the value of the tax benefit. Since the
creditor knows that the exclusion of COD income is valuable to the
debtor, the creditor also knows that the debtor is willing to pay a pre-
mium for the opportunity to file under chapter 11. Thus, the optimal
strategy for the creditor is to bid a higher price than it would normally
bid. The creditor, however, is limited by its risk-aversion since the tax
benefits are generally worthless to the creditor.4 " To reduce its risk,
the senior creditor could inform the debtor that the senior creditor is
willing to bid a higher price for the company's equity interests despite
the worthlessness of the tax benefits to the creditor. By making a be-
lievable stand and informing the debtor about the creditor's position,
the creditor should be able to get a higher bid from the debtor in the
debtor's new value plan.'5"
The fact that creditors could capture any of the tax benefits is
troublesome because these benefits belong to the individual partners
and not to the creditor. Furthermore, the individual partners are
merely deferring their tax liability. Any exclusion of COD income re-
quires a commensurate reduction of the tax attributes of the debtor in
14 See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P'ship, 190 B.R_ 567, 576 (Bankr. N.D. In. 1995)
("The principal of the general partner estimated the collective tax liability of the part-
ners, in the event of foreclosure, at $20 million."), affd, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). For a detailed discussion on the partnership taxation in the
single-asset case, see Cardinali & Miller, supra note 136, at 100-04.
As a policy matter, I.RC. § 108(a) is improperly distorting the incentives of the
bankruptcy system since it will likely encourage more reorganizations under chapter 11
than are socially optimal. The reason is that the tax benefit is a private benefit that
reduces the costs of filing a petition for relief under chapter 11.
144 The reason is because § 108(a) applies only to taxpayers who are filing under
chapter 11 or who are insolvent-characteristics which creditors generally do not pos-
sess.
M, The reason is that the exclusion of discharge of indebtedness applies only to
taxpayers who are in chapter 11 or insolvent. See supra note 144.
For a discussion on how to strengthen one's bargaining power by binding one-
self to an immutable position, see THOMfAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
221.46 (1980).
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the order listed in § 108(b) (2).15 These tax attributes include net op-
erating losses of the company 52 and the basis of the taxpayer in de-
preciable property that was sold. 153 Thus, while the taxpayer reduces
her present tax liability under § 108(a), she will usually pay more taxes
in the future. The taxpayer has merely deferred paying her taxes. 4
Under the new reorganization process, the senior creditors would
be receiving the equivalent of a double tax benefit. The senior credi-
tors capture some of the debtor's gain from the tax deferral in the
form of additional consideration, and they will not have to reduce any
of their future tax attributes since they did not exclude any income
under § 108(a).' 55 This is a violation of the taxation principles of fair-
ness and equity because the tax deferral provisions of § 108 were
meant for bankrupt or insolvent taxpayers, not for creditors like the
bank in this case.' 56 Despite violating principles of fairness and equity,
the optimal price of the winning bidder must include some of the tax
benefits in order to ensure that the secured creditors would not veto
the new value plan.
b. Best Price Under the Competing Plans Option
The same concerns of bankruptcy law and tax law also apply to
bidders under the competing plans option. Under the competing
151 I.RC. § 108(b) (1994).
52 See id. § 108(b) (2) (A) (stating that unless the taxpayer elects to reduce the basis
first, an excluded COD income will be applied to reducing any NOL for the taxable
year of the discharge, and any NOL carryover to such taxable years).
153 See id. § 108(b) (2) (E) (stating that the taxpayer can apply excluded COD in-
come to reducing the basis of the taxpayer in the property pursuant to § 1017 once
prior tax attributes are reduced). Section 108(b) (5) allows a taxpayer to elect to apply
the excluded COD income to reducing the basis before applying the excluded income
to reducing the NOLs.
15 Tax deferral is an active goal for prudent taxpayers due to the time value of
money. The time value of money refers to the fact that money paid in the present is
worth more than the same amount of money paid in the future since one can invest
the money in a bank and get a guaranteed return on the money. The time value of
money is the principle behind the use of discounted cash flow and net present value,
both of which seek to evaluate the stream of future payments in terms of present-day
money. For a more detailed discussion on the time value of money, see BUTLER, supra
note 41, at 183-87.
155 The bank would still include the excess consideration in its tax return by reduc-
ing the amount of worthless debt it deducted as a trade or business expense. See I.R.C.
§ 162(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (allowing a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business
to deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred).
156 See id. § 108(a) (1) (A)-(B) (stating that income exclusion applies only to taxpay-
ers in chapter 11 or to the amount of their insolvency).
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plans option, the undersecured creditor will likely propose liquidation
of all the assets, with the proceeds from the collateral going to the se-
cured creditor and the proceeds from the sale of any other assets be-
ing divided among the unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. On
the other hand, the debtor will likely propose a series of payments to
the secured and unsecured creditors with old equity holders retaining
an equity interest. The net present value of the undersecured credi-
tor's plan likely will be the liquidation value. 7 The net present value
of the debtor's plan depends upon how much the debtor is proposing
to pay the creditors. This should always exceed the liquidation value,
so the price should always exceed the net present value of the under-
secured creditor's plan.
Using auction theory, it becomes clear that the price paid for the
equity interest under the competing plans option will be the same as
the price paid under the competing bids option. In the competing
bids option, the debtor's plan is the basic template, and the final con-
firmed plan pays out at least as much as the debtor's plan. The net
present value of the final plan would exceed the net present value of
the debtor's new value plan only if a bidder is willing to pay more than
the debtor is willing to pay. Since the debtor should have the highest
-vluation of the company, the winning bidder should be old equity
holders under the competing bids option because of the value of the
tax deferral. Likewise, under the competing plans option, the win-
ning plan should be the new value plan since that plan must also
agree to pay the creditors some portion of the going concern value
and the tax deferral benefits to ensure acceptance and deter a differ-
ent party from making the winning bid. Thus, the optimal strategy for
old equity holders is the same in both cases and the price obtained
under either method should be the same. Disparity should occur only
when the net present values of the competing plans are difficult to
compute. The competing bids option does not suffer from this poten-
tial problem since the only difference between the new value plan and
the final confirmed plan would be cash. The creditors would just vote
for the plan that pays the most cash.
17 See supra Part III.B.3.a.i (noting that the higher price reflects, among other con-
siderations, the debtor's belief that the going concern value of the company is posi-
tive). Net present value discounts the value of cash payments to the present value but
there is no need for such discounting when there is a liquidation since the cash pay-
ments are made in the present.
158 See supra Part III.B.3.a (noting that the new value plan must give the senior
creditor some of the going concern value and tax deferral to ensure approval by senior
creditors of the plan).
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C. Which Option Should the Bankruptcy Court Use?
Subjecting the two methods to analysis under auction theory has
not shown which method is clearly superior. The bankruptcy court
could use either method and satisfy the market valuation requirement
imposed by the 203 N. LaSalle Court since both methods should yield
the same price and impose the same limitations on the number of
purchasers. There is a slight advantage, however, for the competing
bids option based upon the possibility of a wide disparity in the com-
peting plans.'5 9 This would preserve the debtor's exclusive ability to
shape the reorganization plan. Creditors, however, would prefer the
competing plans option over the competing bids option because it al-
lows them to craft a plan that would benefit them. A bankruptcy
judge should allow the debtor to use the competing bids option if the
debtor can do so within the exclusivity period, but allow competing
plans if the debtor is unable to do so by the end of the exclusivity pe-
riod. This would preserve the bargaining positions originally estab-
lished in the Code. In fact, this appears to be what Judge Wedhoff is
doing in the 203 N. LaSalle case on remand.' 6°
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO NEW VALUE PLANS
Since both methods of conforming a new value plan to satisfy the
203 N. LaSae Court have serious problems, what other options does
the bankruptcy court have to resolve these cases? One option is to
prevent single-asset debtors from using the new value exception.
There has been some discussion asserting that single-asset real estate
debtors should not be allowed to file for bankruptcy because bank-
ruptcy is not the proper vehicle for such cases."6' The reason given for
159 See Epling, supra note 100 (arguing that competing plans can be so different it
would be like comparing apples to oranges).
160 See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'Ship, 246 B.R. 325, 328 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)
(noting that both the debtor and the Bank intended to file competing plans).
161 See, e.g., Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068,
1073 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the protection of the bankruptcy laws is not proper
under these circumstances because there is no going concern to preserve, there are no
employees to protect, and there is no hope of rehabilitation"); H. Miles Cohn, Good
Faith and the Single-Asset Debtor, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131 (1988) (arguing that single-asset
debtors should not survive a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition for bad faith un-
less they can show some legitimate purpose such as liquidation or restructuring of
debt); Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement: Why Re-
luctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect Result, 9
BANKR. DEv.J. 77 (1992) (arguing that most single-asset debtors should not be permit-
ted to file for bankruptcy under chapter 11 because there is no common pool problem
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this proposal is that cases involving single-asset real estate debtors
generally involve "a debtor and one creditor," a type of dispute "for
which state law remedies were designed.',6 2 In any case, since there is
little if any going concern value associated with single-asset real estate
debtors,'" the bankruptcy court could just disallow such debtors from
using the new value exception since that exception envisioned the
need for an infusion of new capital to ensure the success of a going
concern.'6' A bankruptcy court that follows this line of thinking, how-
ever, may preclude single-asset debtors who have legitimate reasons to
use the new value exception from using it in order to reorganize its
business. This would then effectively destroy the creditors' incentive
to negotiate with the debtor.165 Furthermore, since single-asset debt-
ors have been allowed into bankruptcy courts before, it is unlikely that
the bankruptcy courts can deny such debtors access to bankruptcy re-
lief. Rather, it will likely require congressional action to bar single-
asset debtors from the bankruptcy courts.
A better solution would be to discourage single-asset debtors from
filing a chapter 11 plan in the first place by amending the Internal
Revenue Code. If Congress amended § 108(a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to exclude all gains from a liquidation proceeding under
chapter 7 in the same manner as the section excludes COD income
under chapter 11,"" old equity holders would no longer have an in-
centive to retain an equity interest in the company. Thus, the prob-
lems associated with the new value exception, including the problems
with using the two methods analyzed in this Comment to satisfy the
LaSalle Court, would no longer exist since there would be no need for
and they do not have a going concern value); Salvatore G. Gangemi & Stephen Bor-
danaro, Note, The New Value Exception: Square Peg in a Round Hole, 1 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. RE. 173 (1993) (arguing that single asset debtors should not be allowed to use the
new value exception).
162 ALCES & HowARD, supra note 17, at 655.
1 SeeAyer, supra note 4, at 1001 n.202 (arguing that when the debtor's sole asset is
an office building, the going concern value and the liquidation value are the same).
I(A See Gangemi & Bordanaro, supra note 161, at 192 (arguing that the "new value
exception's application in single asset reorganizations cannot be supported by the pos-
sibility that a reorganization will fail absent an infusion of new value").
See Mark E. MacDonald et al., Confirmation ly Cramdown Through the New Value
Exception in Single Asset Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 65, 78-84 (1993) (arguing that
"ambiguity in valuation creates legitimate zones for negotiations among creditors and
interest holders" that would not occur without the new value exception).
I(. SeeJack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INsT. L.
REv. 153, 178 (noting that the National Bankruptcy Conference has suggested that "in
a bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 or 11, all income attributable to the disposition of
the property should be treated as COD income under IRC section 108" and arguing
that "[this] proposal should also apply to the extent that a taxpayer is insolvent").
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the single-asset debtor to file a new value plan. Amending I.R.C. § 108
would, therefore, provide the cleanest method of dealing with new
value plans filed by single-asset debtors.
CONCLUSION
The new value exception to the absolute priority rule has been a
favorite topic for commentators because of the ambiguity around its
inception and the Supreme Court's lack of clarity in stating whether
the new value exception exists in the current Code. While the Court
in 203 N. LaSalle has provided the clearest signal yet that the new
value exception still exists, it has limited the exception further by
requiring that insiders lose their exclusive right to contribute new
capital in return for equity interests in the reorganized company.
Such a requirement will likely lead to one of two methods for a bank-
ruptcy court to confirm a new value plan: by allowing for competing
plans, or by allowing any and all parties to bid for the equity interests.
There is good news for bankruptcy judges, however, since either
method will likely satisfy the 203 N. LaSalle Court. The competitive
bidding option is slightly more preferable than the competing plans
option since it allows creditors and the bankruptcy court to more eas-
ily compare the competing offers. Both methods, however, have prob-
lems, including a limit on the number of competing purchasers and
the transfer of tax benefits to senior creditors.
The problems with the competitive reorganization process envi-
sioned by the Court in 203 N. LaSalle reflect the need to align bank-
ruptcy and tax policies. More specifically, the Internal Revenue Code
should be amended to eliminate the debtor's incentive to file for
bankruptcy under chapter 11. As currently enacted, § 108 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code greatly increases the costs to the debtor of filing
under another chapter of the Code. By eliminating the benefits of fil-
ing for bankruptcy under chapter 11, both single-asset real estate
debtors and their creditors will benefit. The debtors will retain their
tax advantage while the creditors will be able to more quickly cut their
losses by receiving their share of the bankrupt company's liquidated
assets.
167 This signal was, however, dictum. See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449 (finding
that there is sufficient ambiguity in the statutory text of § 1129(b) to allow for "the pos-
sibility apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on the books
as [11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii)] may carry a new value corollary").
